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Abstract
This paper analyzes the merits of a novel method of eliminating the power of a
gerrymanderer that involves an endogenous weighting system for elected representatives. This
endogenous weighting system ties the voting weight of elected representatives in the legislature
to the share of the voters who voted for that representative's party and to the share of
representatives elected from that party. If the weights are set correctly, it can be shown in simple
voting models like Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999) that redistricting has no influence on the
policy passed by the legislature. This benefit, though, is out-weighed by the fact that, in more
realistic voting models, the gerrymanderer can manipulate the redistricting process to achieve
greater policy bias than under the status quo.
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Introduction

Once a decade, after the results from the US Census are released, state legislatures update district lines
to re‡ect changes in the population. These legislatures face two constraints when modifying district lines.
The …rst constraint is that each district must have roughly the same number of people within its borders,
and the second constraint is that the districts must be contiguous. In addition to these legal constraints,
there are informational and geographical limitations as well. These limitations further reduce the scope
of a legislature to gerrymander.
Even given these constraints, the state legislatures still have considerable ‡exibility in determining
the position of these lines. This ‡exibility has given legislators the opportunity to redraw district lines
for personal gain, often helping to ensure that either incumbents or representatives from their party are
elected in future elections.
There has been considerable research devoted to understanding the consequences of gerrymandering.
Theoretical analyses including Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006), Gul and Pesendorfer (2010), King (1989),
and Shotts (2002) show that optimal redistricting leads to partisan bias. This partisan bias implies that
the translation between the vote share received by a political party and the number of seats obtained by
that party depends on the party in question. Further, this partisan bias has been shown to lead to policy
bias (Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999)), a situation in which the resulting policy di¤ers from the preferred
policy choice of the median voter. Several empirical studies have supported these conclusions, including
Gelman and King (1990), Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999), King and Browning (1987), and Kousser (1996).
These papers, focusing on US data, …nd both substantial policy bias in the states and that gerrymandering
has sometimes worsened that bias.
Given the potential costs of gerrymandering, a number of researchers have proposed possible solutions.
These solutions typically remove the gerrymanderer completely or they reduce the ‡exibility with which
the gerrymanderer can redraw district lines.

One solution, implemented in 2008 by California, is to

have a neutral committee draw the district lines. While this solution seems appealing, each member of the
committee is likely to have a bias in favor of a particular party, calling into question whether the committee
as a whole can act with neutrality.1 In response, some have called for computers to randomly draw district
lines. However, as Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006) show, random redistricting does not eliminate partisan
bias, except under an extreme and unrealistic set of assumptions.
Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006), in the same paper, also propose adding an additional constraint to
the process of gerrymandering. If a gerrymanderer, they suggest, is forced to maximize the homogeneity
of voters within a district, then it can be shown that the gerrymanderer’s choice results in no partisan
1 In

fact, King (1989) and Kousser (1996) provide evidence that within certain states, partisan bias increased after a

neutral committee redrew the district lines.
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bias. One …nal solution discussed in the literature is to create districts that elect multiple representatives,
although there is a concern that these at-large districts reduce minority representation.
In this paper, we explore the merits of an alternative solution. This solution does not limit the
ability of a gerrymanderer to redraw district lines, but instead it reduces the bene…ts that come from
gerrymandering. It accomplishes this by endogenizing the voting weight that each elected representative
is accorded when in the legislature. Speci…cally, the solution sets the weight of each representative elected
equal to the vote share received by the representative’s party in the entire state divided by the share of
representatives elected from that same party. This endogenous weighting system ensures that a party’s
total weight in the legislature is independent of the number of representatives elected from that party.
If one introduces this endogenous weighting system into the simple voting model of Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999), it is straight-forward to show that the gerrymanderer has no in‡uence on the state’s policy
outcomes. That is, the endogenous weighting system guarantees that there is no policy bias, regardless
of the size of the partisan bias.

Moreover, the resulting voting weight of each party is proportionally

responsive, meaning that for each 1% increase in a party’s vote share in the state, the party’s total weight
in the legislature rises by 1%.
In section 2 of this paper, we de…ne our weighting system and explore some of its key properties. Section
3 analyzes the merits of this endogenous weighting system. As we will show, there are severe drawbacks
to this weighting system, drawbacks su¢ ciently large as to undermine the bene…ts of the solution. Section
4 concludes.
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Model

The simple voting model described below follows Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999).
Consider a political jurisdiction with N voters, where for simplicity N is assumed to be an odd number.
The voters are divided into two types: there are ND voters of type D and NR voters of type R, where
ND + NR = N . The voters of type D prefer Democratic candidates, while the voters of type R prefer
Republican candidates. All voters within each type are assumed to be homogenous. Let VD
the vote share obtained by all the Democratic candidates in the jurisdiction and VR

NR
N

ND
N

be

be the vote

share obtained by all the Republican candidates in the jurisdiction.
The political jurisdiction is divided into K, single-representative districts. Each district is constrained
to have the same number of voters, meaning that the population in each district is
that K is such that
NR;i

N
K.

We assume

N
K

is an integer. District i 2 f1; 2; :::; Kg contains ND;i Democratic voters and
K
K
X
X
Republican voters, where
ND;i = ND and
NR;i = NR . There are two political parties
i=1

i=1

that sponsor a candidate in each district: the Democratic party and the Republican party. The voters
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in each district elect one of these representatives to represent them in the legislature in a winner-takeall election. All representatives within each party are assumed to be homogenous. Let D be the total
number of Democratic representatives elected across all districts, and R be the total number of Republican
representatives elected across all districts.
A gerrymanderer chooses how to allocate voters across the districts. The gerrymanderer understands
that district i will elect a Democratic representative if there are ND;i

N
K

+1
2

Democratic voters within

that district and a Republican candidate otherwise.2 Given any allocation, we can determine the resulting
partisan bias of the choice. Partisan bias is de…ned as
= ln

D
K

1

D
K

!

when the vote shares of the two parties are roughly equal. This value measures the size of the discrepancy
in representatives elected relative to the voters’preferences.

2.1

The e¢ cient gerrymander

Suppose a gerrymanderer’s objective is to allocate voters across the districts in order to maximize the number of representatives elected from her own party. As is well-known in the literature, the gerrymanderer
will create as many districts where the voters from her own party enjoy the smallest possible majority. In
particular, assuming without loss of generality that the gerrymanderer is a Democrat, she will create as
many districts as possible with

N +K
2K

Democratic voters and

N K
2K

Republican voters. This allocation is

e¢ cient because it creates the smallest possible majority for Democrats in the most districts.
As is well-known in the literature, the e¢ cient gerrymander leads to high levels of partisan and polic
bias. Following the results in Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999), we can show that the maximum bias created
by the e¢ cient gerrymander is
= ln

N +1
K 1

This bias is increasing in N and decreasing in K.

2.2

An alternative weighting system

In this section, we introduce and analyze an alternative weighting system for representatives.
Before we get to the de…nitions of the weights and our main results, it is helpful to understand what
we mean by weighting system. Under the current system, each elected representative gets 1 vote when
deciding policy.
2 We

That is, if D Democratic candidates and R Republican candidates are elected to the

assume that there are always su¢ cient voters of the minority party that a gerrymanderer cannot allocate voters

across districts so that only one party’s representatives are elected.
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legislature, then when the legislature votes on a particular policy proposal, each representative receives
one vote. This means that the Democratic party, in total, gets D votes, while the Republican party, in
total, gets R votes.

As a consequence, if D > R, then the outcome of the policy debate is resolved in

favor of the Democrats. By altering the allocation of the voters across districts, a gerrymanderer can bias
policy outcomes in favor of one party by increasing the number of representatives elected from that party.
In e¤ect, partisan bias causes policy bias.
Suppose, though, that the weighting system is no longer one in which all representatives receive one
vote.

Under this type of alternative, particular candidates could receive more than 1 vote, meaning

that they would have a relatively large in‡uence on the policy outcome, while other candidates could
receive less than 1 vote, meaning that they would have a relatively small in‡uence on the policy outcome.
As we will show, our proposed endogenous weighting system leads to no policy bias and to proportional
representation in this simple model, regardless of the gerrymanderer’s allocation of voters across districts.
De…ne the endogenous weighting system to be as follows: let the weight of each Democratic candidate
elected be wD and the weight of each Republican candidate elected be wR , where
wD

=

wR

=

VD
D
D+R

VR
R
D+R

Notice that the weight of a particular candidate depends on two factors: the vote share of the candidate’s
party within the entire political jurisdiction and the representative share of the party. Speci…cally, the
weights are increasing in the …rst factor and decreasing in the second.
As we will argue, the relationship between the weight and the factors is normatively appealing. First,
consider the fact that the weight of the Democratic party, for example, depends positively on the vote share
earned by the Democratic party. This dependence is bene…cial in that the Democratic party’s in‡uence
on policy outcomes depends positively on how many voters vote for the Democratic party.

Second,

consider the fact that the weight of the Democratic party falls as more Democratic representatives are
elected. This dependence is bene…cial because it undermines the bene…ts of gerrymandering. That is,
if a gerrymanderer chooses a redistricting that increases the representatives elected from her party, this
redistricting will also reduce the weight given to each representative elected. As such, the gerrymanderer
cannot bias the policy outcomes through the redistricting process, even if she can still achieve partisan
bias.
Now, given the weighting system, we can describe our main results in the following propositions:
Proposition 1 wD D + wR R = D + R
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Proof.
wD D + wR R

=

VD
D
D+R

D+

VR
R
D+R

R

= VD (D + R) + VR (D + R)
= D+R

This proposition states that, regardless of the voter allocation chosen by the gerrymanderer, the weighting system does not change the total number of representative votes in a legislature.

That is, if the

legislature contains X representatives, then under the weighting system, the total number of votes remains
X.
Proposition 2 The weighting system results in no policy bias.
Proof. To show that the weighting system results in 0 policy bias, we need to show that wD D =
VD (D + R) :
wD D

=

VD
D
D+R

D

= VD (D + R)

This proposition highlights an important point: whereas the e¢ cient gerrymanderer can achieve a
substantial policy bias under the current system, the gerrymanderer has no power to alter the total weight
of her party in the legislature under the endogenous weighting system. This is because the total weight
accorded to a party depends entirely on the vote share received by that party. Moreover, as the above
proof makes clear, the gerrymanderer’s redistricting choice results in no policy bias for any value of VD .
Proposition 3 A party’s total weight in the legislature is proportionally responsive to the share of the
vote received by that party over the relevant range of vote shares.
Proof. Assume that there are always su¢ cient voters of the minority party that a gerrymanderer cannot
alter district lines so that only one party’s representatives are elected.3 The proposition states that for
each 1% rise in the vote share of a particular party, that party’s weight in the legislature rises by 1%.
3 This

is the ’relevant range,’as mentioned in the proposition.
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Put another way, we must show that the elasticity of the party’s weight to vote share is equal to unity.
wD D;VD

=
=

@wD D VD
@VD wD D
0
D @ VD
D
D+R

= D+R
=

VD

D
D+R

D

1
A

1
D+R

1

This proposition follows from the previous: because a party’s weight depends entirely on the vote share
received by the party, if the vote share rises or falls, the party’s weight rises or falls by the same amount.
Taken together, we have shown that the endogenous weighting system does not alter the total number
of votes cast in the legislature, but rather it alters the distribution of the votes in such a way as to eliminate
the power of the gerrymanderer to in‡uence the policy outcomes.

3

Discussion

In this section, we discuss the potential merits of this endogenous weighting system.
The most direct bene…t of the weighting system is that, at least in this simple model, the gerrymanderer
can no longer in‡uence policy outcomes by manipulating the district lines. This is because the total weight
of the representatives from each party depends entirely on the vote share obtained by that party and not
on the number of representatives elected. As such, the total weight given to each political party is not
manipulable. Put simply, the weighting system ensures that gerrymandering is no longer productive.
An additional bene…t of the endogenous weighting system is that it would encourage more voters to
vote. To see this, compare the current system with the proposed endogenous weighting system. Under
both systems, a voter chooses to vote when the bene…t of voting outweighs the cost. One factor driving the
bene…t of voting is the likelihood of the voter being pivotal in the election. Under the current system, the
probability of being pivotal varies inversely with the total number of voters. Consequently, it is optimal
for each voter to employ a mixed strategy when voting, voting with some probability p and not voting
with probability 1

p. Under the endogenous weighting system, though, the probability of being pivotal

rises. This is because the voter’s vote in‡uences the weight given to the party’s representatives, even if
the voter’s preferred representative is not elected. This additional incentive should lead more people to
vote.
There are a number of drawbacks associated with this endogenous weighting system. One drawback
is that, if this weighting system does in fact eliminate the in‡uence of a gerrymanderer, then it would be
6

doubtful that the party in power would enact the policy. This implies that this weighting system, as well
as any other possible solution to the problem of gerrymandering, is unlikely to be implemented.4
A second, and perhaps more severe, drawback is that, if we assumed a more realistic model, the
endogenous weighting system can lead to greater policy bias than the current system. To show this, we
will construct a simple model that involves greater voter heterogeneity. Suppose that there are 9 voters
and 3 districts. The preferred policy points of the voters are distributed across a uni-dimensional policy
space.

For simplicity, assume that voter i prefers that a policy has value i, meaning that the median

voter’s preferred policy is 5. The …rst 5 voters are labeled Democrats, and the last 4 voters are labeled
Republican. If the gerrymanderer is a Democrat, the natural question is ’how large a policy bias can the
gerrymanderer achieve under the two systems?’
First, let us consider the current system in which all representatives receive one vote. The e¢ cient
Democratic gerrymander would involve putting voters 1,2, and 9 in district 1, voters 3,4, and 8 in district
2, and voters 5,6,and 7 in district 3.

The representative chosen in each district would then re‡ect the

preferred policy of each district’s median voter, meaning that the representative in district 1 would have
a preferred policy of 2, the representative in district 2 would prefer 4, and the representative in district 3
would prefer 6. The median representative, then, would have a preferred policy of 4, implying that the
policy enacted would be 4. The resulting policy bias is therefore 1.
Now, consider the endogenous weighting system. The e¢ cient Democratic gerrymander in this case
would involve putting voters 1,2, and 3 in district 1, voters 4,6, and 7 in district 2, and voters 5,8,
and 9 in district 3.

The representatives in the three districts would then prefer 2,6, and 8.

the representatives would not have equal weight when deciding policies in the legislature.
Democratic representative would have a weight of
have a weight of

2
3

=

4
9
2
3

5
3

=

5
9
1
3

However,

In fact, the

, while each Republican representative would

. Since the one Democratic representative has more than half the vote in the

legislature, that representative can determine the policy outcome by herself. Thus, the resulting policy
bias is 3, a larger bias than under the current system with …xed weights.
To understand why the gerrymanderer was able to achieve a greater policy bias under the endogenous
weights, note that the weights are designed to undermine the power of the gerrymanderer by increasing
the voting weight of a party’s representatives hurt by the redistricting and decreasing the voting weight of
a party’s representatives helped by the redistricting. Knowing this, though, the gerrymanderer can take
advantage of the algorithm by purposely reducing the number of representatives elected by her own party.
This is an e¤ective way to increase the weight of a few representatives. At the extreme, the gerrymanderer
4 Of

course, we do see examples of states that try to reduce the power of the gerrymanderer.

In fact, numerous states

have recently moved to a system in which a neutral committee decides how to draw the district lines, including Washington,
California, and Arizona.
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can allocate voters so that only one representative is elected from her party, giving the entire voting weight
of the party to that one legislator. Further, if the voting share of the gerrymanderer’s party is greater
than 50%, then that one representative becomes a dictator, deciding all policies in her favor.

4

Conclusion

In this paper, we have analyzed whether a novel and endogenous weighting system can eliminate the
bene…ts of gerrymandering. This weighting system sets each elected candidate’s voting weight equal to
the vote share received by the candidate’s party within the entire jurisdiction divided by the representative
share obtained by that party. Given these endogenous weights, it is straight-forward to show that a party’s
total weight in the legislature depends entirely on the vote share received by the party in the jurisdiction.
As a result, in the baseline model of Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999), the weighting system guarantees that
a gerrymanderer is unable to in‡uence the policy outcomes of the legislature.

Moreover, the resulting

voting weight given to each party is proportionally responsive.
While this weighting system has a couple of appealing features, the drawbacks of the endogenous
weights are large.

The …rst drawback is implementability: if any proposed solution could e¤ectively

undermine the in‡uence of a gerrymanderer, the party in power would be unlikely to implement it, as it
reduces that party’s ability to in‡uence future elections and policies. Second, if the policy were enacted,
realistic models imply that a gerrymanderer not only retains her in‡uence, but she is better able to create
policy bias.
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